

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	ix
<i>List of Tables</i>	x
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xiii
<i>Glossary of Abbreviations</i>	xviii
Part I Global Governance	1
1 Globalization and Governance: an Overview	3
<i>Majid Tehranian</i>	
Evolution of the capitalist state	4
Evolution of the capitalist market	6
Evolution of global governance	8
Globalization and its discontents	19
The emerging imbalances	22
2 Taming Capital, Holding Peace	28
<i>Majid Tehranian</i>	
Evolution of <i>de facto</i> governance	29
The rise of global capitalism	31
A global apartheid?	32
Sites of insecurity and resistance	34
Globalism: Hegemonic versus communitarian	37
Regionalism: Exclusionary versus inclusionary	40
Nationalism: Totalitarian-aggressive versus democratic-benign	40
Localism: Parochial versus liberal	44
Feminism: Patriarchy versus equality	47
Environmentalism: Exploitative versus protective	48
Revivalism: Sectarian versus ecumenical	49
3 Democratizing Governance	55
<i>Majid Tehranian</i>	
Global democracy	55
The eternal triangle	58
Global policy-formation process	61
A democratic drift?	63
Concluding observations	67

Part II Global Financial Flows	75
4 The Political Economy of Globalization: the Old and the New <i>Stephen Gill</i>	77
Globalization as a trend and globalization as a political project	77
Economic development and political legitimacy in a globalized world	78
Political legitimacy and the restoration of capitalism after 1945	79
The forms of globalization today	80
The world economic crisis of the 1990s: Economic stability and political legitimacy	85
Reform proposals	87
5 Financial Globalization: the State, Capital and Policy-making <i>Kamal Malhotra, Marco Mezzera and Mümtaz Keklik</i>	90
Globalization in its contemporary setting	90
Globalization of finance and capital flows	94
Envisioning new globalization: Trends for the future	99
6 The Asian Financial Crisis and IMF Intervention <i>Marco Mezzera and Kamal Malhotra</i>	106
Cyclical financial booms and busts	106
The origins of the Asian financial crisis	107
Who lost and who gained	110
Proposed adjustments: the right remedies?	112
7 The Role of Portfolio Investors in the Asian Financial Crisis <i>Adam Harmes</i>	117
Institutional investors and the financial markets	117
The building of Thailand's bubble economy	119
1996 not 1997: the onset of the Asian crisis	122
Policy implications	123
8 The Case for Regional and Global Financial Regulation <i>Marco Mezzera, Kamal Malhotra and Mumtaz Keklik</i>	127
The 'pros' and 'cons' of unregulated capital flows	127
Reforming the global financial system: Official responses	132
Issues in control and regulation	136
Tobin and other taxes on foreign-exchange transactions	140
9 Renewing the Governance of the Global Economy <i>Kamal Malhotra</i>	146
The context and opportunity	146

Rethinking objectives and strategies for sustainable human and social development	146
Prospects and proposals	148
Part III Global Peace and Security	163
10 Conflict Prevention: Towards a Multi-dimensional Approach <i>Michalis S. Michael</i>	165
Conceptual framework: Conflict-management typology and definition of concepts	165
A survey of the UN and other multilateral prevention initiatives	168
Future possibilities	172
Conclusion	176
11 The UN and Disarmament: a Global and Regional Action Plan <i>Michael Hamel-Green</i>	181
An overview of the UN's disarmament role	182
Strengths and weaknesses in UN disarmament approaches	183
Current UN disarmament proposals and initiatives	184
Proposed new UN disarmament policies, strategies and initiatives	186
Conclusion	194
12 The Politics of Biological and Chemical Disarmament <i>Susan Wright</i>	198
The evolution of the 'rogue doctrine'	198
Implementation of the 'rogue doctrine'	201
Appraisal	203
Concluding proposals	206
13 Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations: a Survey <i>Eşref Aksu</i>	212
Reform studies: Detecting common denominators	212
Discerning the global 'reform project'	215
Reflections on the global 'reform project'	223
Conclusion	226
14 Peace Operations: the Road Ahead <i>Joseph A. Camilleri</i>	230
Key principles that should govern peace operations	230
A word on method	234
Assessment phase	235
Authorization/early planning phase	239
Implementation phase	244
Organizational arrangements	246
Peacebuilding	247

Part IV Reimagining the Future	253
15 Major Structural Reform	255
<i>Joseph A. Camilleri</i>	
General Assembly	257
People's Assembly	257
Consultative Assembly	258
Security Council	259
Economic and Social Security Council	261
Secretary-General/Secretariat	262
Financial arrangements	263
Regional organizations	265
Emerging global civil society	268
16 The Politics of Reform	272
<i>Joseph A. Camilleri</i>	
Governance and global social change	274
Structural impediments	275
Countervailing tendencies	277
Strategy for change	279
<i>Select Bibliography</i>	284
<i>Index</i>	293

1

Globalization and Governance: an Overview

Majid Tehranian

One of the best ways to explore global governance, what world government we actually have had, is to consider the history of world organizations, those intergovernmental and quasi-governmental global agencies that have (nominally) been open to any independent state (even though all states may not have joined).

Craig Murphy (1994), p.1

Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), global governance has been predicated on a territorial state system nested in an international capitalist order. In the twentieth century, the communist, fascist and Third World challenges to that order led to the breakdown of the European, American and Japanese empires. Ultimately, competing national capitalisms and territorial states gave shape to the contemporary institutions of global governance. At the same time, tensions have increased among global capital, territorial states and civil societies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of bipolar rivalries between the American and Soviet camps, a global capitalist regime armed with a neo-liberal ideology has emerged. The neo-liberal project is attempting to integrate the international political economy around the rule of transnational capital. Frictions between global capitalism, the state system and an emerging international civil society are framing the conflicts of the twenty-first century.

Unless a more balanced global governance regime is achieved, violent conflict will continue among and within states. State and counter-state terrorism will also continue to undermine international security. Since trade and investment patterns favour some regions (notably North America, Western Europe and East Asia) in preference to others (notably Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America), widening wealth and income gaps among states are to be expected. But since global capitalism transcends the state system, these widening gaps are also increasingly evident within states. The Quandong Province in China, the Bangalore and Hyderabad regions in India, and Silicon Valley and Orange County in the United States have been growth poles leaping ahead of other regions within their own states while interacting with high-tech industries in a global economy.

Evolution of the capitalist state

Since the Peace of Westphalia, the modern capitalist state has gone through enormous changes. These must be understood in the context of the interplay of four fundamental forces that have framed democratic discourse and practice: the state, the market, civil society and communication networks. The triangle of state, market and civil society floats in a porous circle of national culture penetrated by global economic, military and cultural flows (see Figure 1.1). The public intellectuals in the academic and media worlds, as well as the formal and informal communication networks, serve as the connective nerves of information and analysis in the policy domain. Each of the main stakeholders has gone through an evolutionary process. None of the phases discussed below is applicable to all states, global corporations and civil societies. As the most advanced modern democratic capitalist society, the United States is the best exemplar of some of these developments. Many of the references below will therefore be to American history. Details clearly vary from country to country, but the general drift seems to hold for most parts of the world.




Figure 1.1 Major stakeholders in global governance

Source: M. Tehranian, *Global Communication and World Politics: Domination, Development and Discourse* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p.69.

The modern capitalist state has experienced at least five overlapping and contradictory phases in its evolution. The rise of capitalism prompted the development of a democratic type of state in Western Europe and the United States which called for minimal government interference in business and trade. Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' was part of a classical liberal doctrine that maintained, 'a government is best that governs least'. Historically, however, it was the *visible* hand of the government that, in co-operation with a rising capitalist class, directed the development of national capitalism in a variety of states. Nevertheless, this phase of development of the modern democratic state can be called the *minimalist* state in that government confined itself to the maintenance of national security and a legal framework favourable to capital.

With the rise of monopoly capital in the late nineteenth century, the state went through an important transformation and became a *regulatory* state. The anti-trust legislation passed in the United States during the Progressive Era was a clear effort in this direction, but the return of unbridled capitalism during the 1920s resulted in the Great Crash of 1929 and worldwide depression.

The Great Depression of the 1930s thus ushered in a third shift, from the regulatory to the *social welfare* state. In line with Keynesian economic theories, New Deal policies in the United States took it as axiomatic that the capitalist state must take responsibility for growth and stability, full employment, and a complex array of transfer payments to ensure effective demand for sustained economic development. These transfer payments included unemployment compensation, social security and medical insurance.

The transition from the social welfare to the *warfare* state took place during World War II and its aftermath, the Cold War, when heightened international tensions between the capitalist and communist blocs led to an unprecedented arms race. A perceptive political economist, Joseph Schumpeter, could view capitalism as a relatively peaceful social system prior to this era. But confronted with revolutionary possibilities in its worldwide spheres of investment and trade, the capitalist state consciously turned towards permanent armament.

For the latecomers to industrial revolution, the role of the state in capital accumulation and infrastructure construction has been critical. Although the communist revolutions in Russia, China and other countries espoused a socialist ideology, their centralized state-controlled economies can be more accurately labelled 'state capitalist'. During a period of primitive accumulation, the necessary physical, educational and social infrastructure was built, while civil liberties were suspended and industrialization progressed without significantly raising standards of living. With the introduction of market forces in Russia and China in the 1980s and 1990s, both countries have increasingly entered the global capitalist economy while reducing their antagonism to the West.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, East–West conflicts have given way to North–South antagonisms. Global capitalism faces no credible threat except from its own domestic and international peripheries in the urban ghettos, rural hinterlands and such rebellious states as Iran, Iraq and Libya. The rise during the 1980s and 1990s of a neo-conservative and neo-liberal movement to cut government spending on

social welfare seems, therefore, to have inaugurated a new era that may be called, in Robert Reich's apt phrase, the *corporate welfare* state. This new era also corresponds to the quickening pace of globalization of the markets and increasing world competition for raw materials, sources of investment and consumer markets. It has consequently led to a new division of international labour in which the previously industrialized countries focus on high-tech industries and services (arms, aerospace, computers, biotechnology, banking and insurance). By contrast, the newly industrialized countries concentrate on labour-intensive industries such as production of raw materials, textiles, microprocessing and automobiles. In the meantime, the transitional-industrialized countries of Central and Eastern Europe are desperately trying to find a niche in this new international division of labour. Each capitalist state has thus been attempting to maximize its competitive position in world markets by formally or informally supporting the efforts of its own indigenous corporations while attracting foreign capital to its own shores.

The new capitalist state, whether among the previously industrialized, newly industrialized or transitional-industrialized countries, is a globalist state. While each capitalist state is committed to the welfare of its own indigenous capital, it cannot ignore the stark realities of an increasingly interdependent world market. When the Mexican and East Asian economies faltered in the 1990s, international capital had no hesitation in bailing out their banking and credit systems by substantial loans from the IMF. These loans were tied to the IMF regime of fiscal and monetary adjustments. The new capitalist state in the age of global capitalism is committed to a triple function: military security, economic growth and corporate and social welfare. These goals all imply an activist state co-ordinating its functions with global capital constantly adjusting to the changing world technological and economic environment. The capitalist state thus continues to re-regulate rather than deregulate while shifting the burden of social welfare spending to the private sector. There is no sign of a shrinking state. On the contrary, government spending as a proportion of GDP has been moving ever upward in all major capitalist countries, with that proportion growing by an average rate of 50 per cent from 1870 to 1996.

Evolution of the capitalist market

Similarly, we may discern an evolutionary process in the changing national and global capitalist markets. The movement from *national* to *corporate* and *global* capitalism has been a less sharply punctuated process than the evolution of the state. Although Marx and Engels correctly argued that capitalism is inherently an internationalist system, World Wars I and II were primarily a product of the intense competition among the old and new capitalist states. Britain, France and the United States had already carved out major parts of the world as colonial or neo-colonial territories before Germany, Italy and Japan were strong enough to challenge them.

The defeat of the Axis powers in World War II ushered in a new phase in the development of capitalism that may be called *corporate capitalism*. Led by US

corporate investments in Western Europe, West and East Asia, and Latin America, corporations from Europe, Japan and other newcomers (for example, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia) soon followed suit. The corporation as a business organization offers several unique advantages when compared to other forms of business. It raises vast sums of capital, and disburses them globally. It frees stockholders of personal liability. Expert professionals rather than family members manage it. It has gained legal status as an autonomous entity with the rights of free speech to advertise, to sue and to be sued. And, because of its enormous size and financial capability, it can muster a vast array of lawyers, lobbyists and accountants to influence state laws and regulations to its own advantage.

In the postwar period, several hundred such national corporations became multinational and transnational in scope, attracting capital from all over the world and operating in more than 100 countries. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the opening of China and East Asia to foreign investment, TNCs have achieved virtually global reach. As a consequence, state regulatory systems can no longer exert significant influence on the behaviour of global corporations. National states have to compete for the favour of global corporations rather than the other way around. Public regulation is increasingly placed at the service of private enterprise. In the absence of effective oversight, global regulatory systems cannot but lag behind the development of global capitalism. Not surprisingly, environmental catastrophes, whether in Bhopal, the Amazon rain forest or Sumatra, and financial disasters, whether it be the Mexican or East Asian currency crash, occur with increasing frequency.

In international economic policy, the trends are clearer. Strategic knowledge industries have been heavily promoted by the advanced industrial states. Their interests are strongly protected under a global intellectual property regime. As Michael Ryan writes,

U.S. patent and copyright business interest groups drove trade-related intellectual property policy in the 1980s and 1990s, although the diplomacy was conducted on their behalf by the U.S. executive branch... [Related] industries brought the total to 5.72 per cent of GDP. The copyright industries grew at an average annual rate almost double that of the economy as a whole from 1977 to 1994. In 1994 they employed 3.1 million people, and 2.8 million worked in related industries. By 1995 foreign sales grew to more than 10 per cent of all sales by the U.S. copyright industries; they ranked behind only motor vehicles—auto parts and agricultural products.¹

The strategic alliance between capitalist states and their TNC partners is not new, but the shift to knowledge industries and intellectual-property rights is characteristic of the new phenomenon of global capitalism and informatic imperialism. The locus of decision-making in intellectual property had to be changed from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with its one-nation, one-vote procedures to the the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) forum where decisions reflect bargaining based on economic power. When the

final GATT agreements were signed in Marrakesh in 1994, the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) represented a triumph not only for the US copyright industries but also for the emerging international regime of technological innovation and protection.

Less-developed countries (LDCs) wishing to gain access to foreign trade and capital have had little choice but to buy into this new regime. There is much evidence to suggest that TNCs have appropriated local knowledge and products in the LDCs to patent them under new guises and so protect them from competition. The Indian neem tree, the African soapberry and Central Asian cotton provide examples from which a diversity of useful industrial products can be made by learning the local knowledge. By adopting and developing that knowledge in laboratories through genetic engineering, TNCs have established patent monopolies that deny access to competitors.² The intellectual property regime thus promoted by TRIPS can perpetuate the dominance of existing patent-holders unless and until the LDCs can break through with their own technological innovations and patenting.

Evolution of global governance

To understand the evolution of global governance, it is necessary to review the development of global institutions. These have sprung up with the intensification of social, political and economic relations across state boundaries. Along with territorial states, global institutions currently shape the rule-making, rule-enforcement, rule-adjudication, rule-communication and rule-surveillance functions of our global civilization. It is useful, however, to draw a distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* global governance regimes. The latter basically consists of the UN system and its complex of international treaties. The former includes the UN system but goes well beyond it, encompassing the governance of the global market, society and communication networks by transnational manufacturing, financial and media corporations, as well as by such transnational NGOs as the Catholic Church and Amnesty International. Table 1.1 provides a schematic view of the *de jure* global governance regimes. (For a schematic view of the *de facto* global governance regime, see the next chapter).

We may distinguish four distinct historical periods in the evolution of global governance: the inter-imperial order, the League of Nations system, the United Nations system, and the post-Cold War (dis)order.

The inter-imperial order, 1814–1914

Craig Murphy has identified the beginning of global governance as the *inter-imperial order*, lasting from 1814 to roughly 1914.³ This order included the Austro-Hungarian, Belgian, British, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Swedish empires and their extensions.

The Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance began this era. The Congress of Vienna (September 1814–June 1815), initiated by the alliance that overthrew Napoleon, set out to remake Europe in the post-Napoleonic period. To guarantee

Table 1.1 Evolution of global governance: *De jure* aspects

	Inter-imperial 1814–14	League of Nations 1918–40	United Nations 1945–89	Post-Cold War 1989–present
Rule making	International treaties Concert of Europe resolutions	LN resolutions International treaties	UN resolutions International treaties	UN International treaties Regional organizations (NAFTA, EU, CIS, ASEAN...)
Rule implementation	Imperial states Concert of Europe IGOs	Imperial states IGOs NGOs	Superpowers NATO Warsaw Pact UN IGOs NGOs	Superpower NATO CIS UN IGOs NGOs
Rule adjudication	Permanent Court of Arbitration International Court of Prize	ICJ	ICJ Nuremberg Tribunal	ICJ WTO International Criminal Court ICTY, ICTR
Rule communication	Print media	Print media Radio	Print media Radio TV	Print media Radio TV Internet
Rule surveillance and evaluation	Diplomats Spies Critics	Diplomats Spies Critics	Diplomats Spies Critics	Diplomats Spies Critics

the peace, the Congress created an international balance-of-power system. Diplomatic rights and responsibilities were more precisely defined in European agreements. Such political acts institutionalized the idea of common international zones and inter-state relations.⁴

To preserve their territorial sovereignty, the great powers largely pursued status quo policies based on the balance of power. Whenever international problems arose, they held *ad hoc* conferences collectively known as the Concert of Europe. Spain and Italy both experienced uprisings in support of constitutional government in the years 1820 and 1822 respectively, but the Concert was able to exert its influence and suppress them, although Britain refused to join in the Concert's attempt to intervene in Latin America's revolutions.

The enunciation of the US Monroe Doctrine in 1823⁵ prevented European states from gaining control of Latin America.⁶ It asserted that the United States did not belong to the European political system, that a distinctive system existed on the western side of the Atlantic, and that the United States saw itself as the protector of independent nations in the Americas.⁷ The implication of the Doctrine was that

the American states could not participate in the political discussions of the European powers. Although many European nations were reluctant to comply formally with its tenets, the Monroe Doctrine represented one of the first attempts to devise a code of conduct between Europe and the United States, significantly increasing the scope of international governance.

The Concert of Europe lasted for 90 years, during which the Crimean War was the only major international war. Unable to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Concert's legitimacy quickly faded thereafter. The Concert did, however, enjoy significant legitimacy for a period of time, during which it provided a communication channel between the European states without infringing on their sovereignty or proposing a common moral consensus. The need for further institutionalization of governance would soon be demonstrated by the outbreak of World War I.

In the meantime, global institutionalization was proceeding in such functional areas as telecommunication and transportation. New telecommunication technologies, in particular, were reinforcing the need for international co-operation. The first of these was the telegraph, which allowed information to be transmitted in encoded form by signals across long distances. The International Telegraph Union (ITU) was formed in 1865 to regulate this technology. The General Postal Union was formed in 1874, and renamed the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1875. The Radiotelegraph Union (RTU) was also formed in 1906. These institutions were important in establishing the necessary rules for the more efficient governance of international communication. By signing and ratifying the relevant agreements, sovereign states had consented to the domestic enforcement of these rules.

Another international regime focused on the protection of 'intellectual property' – a phrase which came into usage in the 1840s, a time of rapid technological change. Intellectual property refers to innovations that employ patents, copyrights, licences and trademarks for protection against unauthorized use. The current intellectual property regime may be traced back to the establishment of the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), which itself grew out of a merger between two intellectual property organizations formed during the inter-imperial era.

The emergence of these public international unions thus played a critical role in the globalization of the world. By the nineteenth century, a new world order had been established that divided the world between colonizers and colonized, and produced a new international division of labour that assigned the production of raw materials largely to the colonies and manufactured goods to the colonial powers. While capital, technology and management came from the centres, the peripheries provided consumer markets and cheap or slave labour. Global governance in the form of regulating international functional organizations was no longer a mere ambition. It had become a necessity for the new order.

However, Asia was not fully covered by the public international unions. Developed to manage the 'global' economic system, the unions were still primarily focused on western trade. For example, the International Union for Publication of

Customs and Tariffs, formed in 1890, assisted in the liberalization of trade in the western world by publishing only the current tariffs of its member nations. The nineteenth century may thus be considered a period of European global hegemony. Stavrianos argues that Europe was able to act as a global hegemon partly because Asia was simply not interested.⁸ More importantly, however, the key to Europe's success was its modern, capitalist mode of production which rested on the profit motive, scientific and technological innovation, and global expansion. Despite its resistance Asia was forcibly brought into the orbit of the world capitalist system.

The colonization of the Americas also significantly contributed to Europe's hegemonic status, giving it new sources of raw materials and a safety valve for the emigration of its excess labour force. Europe and its various dependencies thus formed the base for the institutions of global governance. The rise of the United States as a world power was a gradual one. Traditionally an anti-colonial country, it would soon rise to imperial status with the support of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. At the turn of the century, the doctrine would be used to justify US imperial expansion into Cuba, Hawaii and the Philippines.

Over the last hundred years, increasing global connections, mediated largely by NGOs, have added yet another element to global governance. Their function has been to address problems often neglected by governments but of intense interest to an emerging global civil society. International NGOs bring together groups of people from around the world sharing common interests and perspectives, and pool resources available to their members to lobby governments. A number of NGOs act independently of governments, but others are directly or indirectly controlled by governments and to that extent are operating under false pretences.

Though initially limited to social services that did not challenge the authority of governments, NGOs have gradually entered into such fields as human rights and environmental protection that cross into politically sensitive domains. The World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations was founded in 1855, the International Veterinarian Congress in 1863, the International Federation of Metal Workers Organization in 1893, and the International Council of Nurses in 1899. In response to the suffering of the war victims, the Red Cross (ICRC) was established in 1863 to assume a neutral role in relief and rehabilitation. The movement, originally intended to remedy the battlefield conditions at Solferino, subsequently evolved into a worldwide system of relief and rehabilitation in natural as well as human-made disasters.⁹

International law determines and limits the boundaries of state and NGO action. Today, the term 'international law' increasingly refers to a body of more or less formalized rules which regulate inter-state relations, and, to a lesser extent, the interaction between states and other international actors. It is primarily based both on customary usage and on the provisions of multilateral or bilateral agreements. It is also influenced by the writings of jurists, unratified treaties, and decisions of international, and even national, tribunals. It is not enforced by any supranational body; but it is recognized in practice, and enforcement is by virtue of world opinion, third-state intervention, sanctions of international organizations and, as a last resort, war.

The movement to promote the rule of international law also gave rise to several NGOs dedicated to that purpose. The Institute of International Law was founded in 1873 in Ghent, Belgium, by Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns who wished the institution to 'develop and implement international law as a codified science responsible for the legal morality and integrity of the civilized world'.¹⁰ The Institute's goal was to legitimize international law, a concept still in its infancy at that time. The primary channel of enforcement, however, was then and continued to be states themselves.

The League of Nations era, 1918–40

The formation of new global institutions often takes place after particularly horrific tragedies which force states to reconsider past patterns of international behaviour. The League of Nations was formed in response to World War I, with the same goal of promoting peace as the Holy Alliance. The League's 26 articles were the same 26 articles contained in the peace treaties concluded after the war. The great powers leading the League wanted to deny Germany the ability to wage war. The League's Covenant also included the principle of national self-determination as well as the exclusive right of individual states to their own domestic affairs. To resolve the potential contradiction between these two principles the League adopted the idea of collective security. As a principle, collective security commits individual member states to act together when they have identified a threat to international peace and security. The League created two organs, the Council and the Assembly. The Council comprised permanent and non-permanent members whose unanimous agreement was needed for the League to adopt any resolution. The failure of the United States to join the League weakened it considerably. While it achieved minor successes in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and set an important precedent for international co-operation, the League was in practice unable to deter aggression.

A number of significant institutional innovations did nevertheless emerge during the inter-war years. In the area of adjudication, the Geneva General Act for the Settlement of Disputes, adopted by the League in 1928, provided for the settlement of disputes between states by the arbitration of five adjudicators. Between 1902 and 1932, the Permanent Court of Arbitration heard 20 cases. The League also established the Permanent Court of Justice in 1922. As with the Court of Arbitration, its jurisdiction was limited by agreement of the parties in each case.

The League also attempted to regulate the world economy. With funding sorely needed for reconstruction and reparations after the war, the League formed the Financial Commission. Its principal functions were to regulate lending to the defeated powers and the Eastern European successor states, reconcile reparations with financial stability, reduce trade barriers, and reconstruct the international monetary system. The international currency exchange system, which came formally into effect in the late nineteenth century, used gold as the standard of exchange. However, in part because of the inherent limitations to liquidity of the gold standard, the system broke down in 1914 and was replaced by a gold-bullion standard. Individual states were ultimately responsible for the enforcement of these and other rules.

Following World War I, new technological developments boosted economic growth. The output of planes, cars, radios and a range of chemical products rose dramatically. The rapid growth of the working class and the establishment of the eight-hour working day, coupled with the development of mass production, encouraged economic development. However, wartime destruction pushed many European governments to print extravagant amounts of money to finance reparations and pay back their creditors. Spiralling inflation set in without end in sight.¹¹ Custom barriers went up in Europe in the 1920s, and in the absence of domestic and international regulation of trade and finance, the Great Depression ensued in the 1930s, prompting record levels of unemployment. That in turn caused governments to redouble their protectionist policies, further hindering world co-operation, with international trade and development shrinking to record lows.

In all this, the League was relatively ineffectual. Following Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931, China immediately appealed to the League, but the latter could do nothing to stop Japan, which subsequently withdrew its membership. It was similarly unresponsive to Italy's conquest of Ethiopia in 1935–36, being unable to reach agreement on critical oil sanctions because of America's refusal to co-operate. The United States at that time controlled half of the world oil trade, making it an indispensable player in any effort. The League also failed to stop Germany's seizure of Austria in 1938.

The Treaty of Versailles had called for heavy war reparations by Germany. A commission that assessed the losses incurred by the civilian population set an amount of \$33 billion¹² in 1921. Economists declared that such a huge sum could not be collected without upsetting international trade and finance. Insisting that Germany must pay, the Allies secured a treaty permitting them to take punitive actions if Germany fell behind in its payments. The harshness of the Treaty fanned the flames of nationalism in Germany, while the allies' subsequent lax enforcement of it paved the way for the upsurge of German militarism in the 1930s. Hitler withdrew Germany from membership of the League in 1933. When he re-militarized the Rhineland in 1936 (a violation of the Treaty of Versailles), the Allies did nothing to stop him, thereby encouraging future German aggression.

A number of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) did survive the League's failure. One of these was the International Labour Organization (ILO), an autonomous part of the League of Nations, which by 1996 had 174 member states. Its functions were not greatly in need of the League's support. Its goals were to improve labour conditions, raise living standards and promote productive employment. The new IGOs obviously responded to perceived and continuing needs in particular functional areas. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), founded in 1930 to manage World War I reparations, facilitated co-operation among the central banks. The UPU and ITU would continue to operate as IGOs under the UN system. Together with other IGOs, they would contribute to the development of international regulation in their respective functional arenas.

In co-operation with NGOs working in their own fields, IGOs would also perform research and lobbying functions. This trend began with the development of

trade unions, notably the International Federation of Metal Workers. The International Chamber of Commerce was established in 1920. Save the Children was formed in 1919 and became globalized in the 1930s. NGOs served to monitor, lobby and publicize their various causes, which ranged from single issues, as in the case of Save the Children, to broad goals of integration, as with the Federation of International Institutions formed in Geneva in 1929. Their membership was diverse, including a mix of individuals, other organizations and sometimes governmental agencies. Using their research networks, NGOs would provide other channels of information and communication, thus helping to develop and promote international rules and regulations.

The United Nations system, 1945–89

The Great Depression and World War II persuaded the international community that institutions were needed with a greater capacity to manage international peace, security and economic affairs. A change of mind had taken place in the United States regarding international organizations. In the aftermath of the war, the United States stood out as the world's most powerful state, in possession of the nuclear bomb and some 50 per cent of the global gross product. Having experienced a great depression and another world war, the US leadership had renounced unilateral isolationism in favour of multilateralist engagement in world affairs.¹³ With the defeat of the Axis powers in sight, the Allied powers (the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union) started making preparations for a postwar order.

Their first significant initiative, the establishment of a new multipurpose global organization to help manage international affairs,¹⁴ was articulated when Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter in August 1941. The name 'United Nations' was originally used to denote the nations allied against Germany, Italy and Japan, with 26 countries signing the Declaration by the United Nations on 1 January 1942, a document that set forth the war aims of the Allied powers. The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union took the lead in designing the new organization and determining its decision-making structures and functions. Although the Big Three and their respective leaders (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) eventually reached a compromise, political differences that foreshadowed the Cold War hindered agreement. These concerned issues of membership, colonies, and voting formulae in the General Assembly and the Security Council. In the case of membership, the Soviet Union demanded voting rights for its constituent republics, while Britain wanted assurances that its colonies would not be placed under UN control. There was also disagreement over the voting system to be adopted in the Security Council, an issue that became known as the power of veto.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Big Three laid the basis for Charter provisions delimiting the authority of the Security Council. They also reached a tentative accord on the number of Soviet republics to be granted independent membership status, and on the creation of a trusteeship system to succeed the League's mandate system.

The Big Three agreements formed the basis of negotiations at the United Nations Conference convened in San Francisco on 25 April 1945. It produced the final Charter of the UN, which enshrined the power of veto for the five permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States). The conference also reached compromises on such issues as the line to be drawn between domestic and international jurisdiction for the protection of human rights, promotion of economic and social welfare, status of colonial areas, distribution of trusteeships, status of regional and defence arrangements, and great-power dominance versus equality of states.

Representatives of 50 states attended the San Francisco Conference, including 21 from the Americas, nine from continental Europe, seven from the Middle East, five from the Commonwealth, two Soviet republics (in addition to the Soviet Union), three from Africa and two from East Asia. All geographic areas of the world were thus represented. The UN Charter was unanimously adopted and signed on 26 June and came into force on 24 October 1945. In 2001, UN membership stood at 189 countries.

International functional regimes

The development of specialized agencies and international functional regimes may be considered the most successful aspect of *de jure* global governance. The arenas of technical co-operation are where the divergent interests of states are most likely to converge. These range from global postal services to the allocation of electromagnetic frequencies, the apportioning of space in the geo-stationary orbit, development of international standards in industrial production, and satellite monitoring of weather conditions. For each of these functions and many others, a specialized agency has been created by inter-governmental agreement that sets the rules, assists in their implementation and sometimes adjudication. Understood in this sense, the system is often referred to as an 'international regime'. By adding 'functional' to this appellation, we arrive at a more precise notion of multidimensional tasks performed by these international functional regimes.

The waning of the United Nations?

In the western world in general and the United States in particular, the initial enthusiasm for the UN came gradually to an end as the West lost its numerical majority. The Soviet and Chinese use of the veto and the increasing number of non-western UN members progressively undermined western control. The anti-colonial stance of the LDCs and growing demands for equality in an unequal world also came into direct conflict with western interests and perceptions. On the economic front, continuing US balance of payment deficits resulting from the Vietnam War led the United States to abandon gold convertibility. The Bretton Woods system had pegged the international exchange system to the US dollar at \$35 per ounce of gold. That system collapsed once the United States decided in 1971 to float its currency.

All these factors came to a head in the early 1970s when a group of oil exporting countries managed to raise the price of crude oil in 1973. The Organization

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, established in 1960), seemed able now to impose its will on the oil companies and the importing countries. Crude oil prices were raised 130 per cent at the Tehran Conference of December 1973, producing an 'oil shock' for the importing countries, compounded by a second oil shock occasioned by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The price of a barrel of crude oil was ultimately raised from \$3 in 1973 to \$30 in 1980. At the UN, OPEC's success encouraged the LDCs in alliance with the Soviet bloc to call in 1974 for a New World Economic Order. That call was soon followed at the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) with a demand for a New World Communication and Information Order. Such calls clearly hit hard at the core of western interests and priorities. The conservative backlash in Britain and the United States in the context of domestic problems and foreign threats helped to bring about the ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, who advocated conservative policies at home and militarist policies abroad. As a result, the UN and UNESCO came under attack in both countries. The commercial media's assault on UNESCO reached a crescendo in the mid-1980s, with the United States, Britain and Singapore withdrawing from the organization. The United States reneged the timely payment of its UN membership dues. Western states increased their pressure on the UN by calling for its reform. These attacks briefly subsided with the Clinton Administration's support for multilateralism. However, the failures of UN interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda-Burundi led NATO to intervene in Kosovo with little reference to the UN.

The inequitable international division of labour between developed and developing countries had for long been a matter of intense debate among political economists. Developed by such neo-Marxist economists as Sweezy,¹⁵ Baran¹⁶ and Frank,¹⁷ the dependency school of economic development emerged out of these debates. It argued that under colonial and neo-colonial rule the international division of labour had imposed the production of raw materials on the LDCs. By contrast, the more developed countries (MDCs) provided capital, industrial goods and financial services. The terms of trade for raw material exports having significantly deteriorated over the years, the LDCs found themselves cheated out of the possibility of using their natural resources for development. In the words of Gunder Frank, the emerging pattern of trade was contributing to the 'development of underdevelopment' in the Third World.¹⁸ The dependency school called for changes to the international division of labour and advised Third World countries to secure an amelioration in the terms of trade, or totally break away from the international market system. The exclusion of agricultural items from the GATT negotiations added fuel to the dependency school's analysis and advocacy. To the developing countries, whose main exports were raw materials, such policies barred them entry into the protected markets of the more-developed countries.¹⁹

On another front, Germany and Japan as well as the larger LDCs felt under-represented in the UN system where great power politics dominated, and Cold War rivalries heavily restricted the UN's peacekeeping role. The Security Council did little to stop or mitigate the aggression by Iraq against Iran in 1980. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait actively supported Iraq by providing funds, while western

powers supplied the arms and ammunitions. As a war of attrition set in, other Persian Gulf states were drawn into the conflict by a tanker war. Ultimately, Iran and Iraq accepted a UN peace plan in 1988, but casualties had risen to over one million dead and one million maimed by the use of chemical and conventional weapons.

The UN system was being bypassed by emerging organizations operating at both the apex and the base of the global governance system.²⁰ While the Bretton Woods institutions (that is, the World Bank and the IMF) and GATT, which is succeeded by the WTO, served primarily the interests of western powers, other IGOs, for example the International Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), were established on a commercial basis to confer on the first comers the right to use the geostationary orbit for satellites. The new technological environment favoured the advanced economies, yet at the same time a mobilized international civil society was beginning to challenge the legitimacy of hegemonic global governance.

The emergence of NGOs

The growth of international civil society augmented the UN system. To cite one obvious example, rising environmental pollution dramatized the need for supranational monitoring and management. The UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the 1958 adoption of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to undertake surveillance of the world environmental pollution were responses to rising public consciousness. In other areas, the need for transnational monitoring and co-ordination was becoming increasingly apparent. The UN system was too slow to respond to the challenge. As a consequence, international civil society took it upon itself to respond wherever states and IGOs were lax or negligent. Just as domestic interest groups in democratic societies had learned to employ the power of organization to pressure their respective governments, so NGOs were learning to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of their causes.

Expanding global communication

The expansion of global telecommunications would greatly contribute to this process. Computers and satellites opened up immense possibilities for the global society. Once government and private monopolies were re-regulated in the 1980s and 1990s, global telecommunication industries took off. Worldwide telecommunication carriers from diverse regions joined together to form joint ventures that have further extended the potential for world communication. As a consequence, new industries, including telecommunication equipment vendors and value-added services or value-added networks, developed in which private enterprise controlled many aspects of communication, thereby blurring state boundaries. This market has since grown exponentially. Technological innovations on the one hand, and privatization and the competition that comes with it on the other are driving the growing market. Value-added networks provide specialized telecommunication services, including high-speed data networks for large corporations, dial-up packet data networks, and Internet access.²¹ The Internet, which has become an integral part of the telecommunication system, originated in a

US Department of Defense programme called Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPANET) established in 1969 to provide computer communication which was safe and efficient among defence-related research organizations. The programme was to be used for electronic mail or e-mail, file transfers, bulletin board news-groups and remote computer access or telnet. The system proved so useful that other organizations began to use it. Eventually, the National Science Foundation established a network that was able to handle a much greater amount of electronic information. The expansion of the World Wide Web during the 1990s brought the Internet within the reach of a wide array of people. Allowing its users to navigate the Internet almost intuitively, directing them with pictorial representations and instructions,²² the growth of the Web has been nothing less than spectacular. Internet hosts increased from 1.3 million mainframe computers in 1993 to 9.5 million in 1996, with subsequent growth continuing at an exponential rate.

The introduction of personal computers in the 1970s and their diffusion in the 1980s and 1990s have broadened and deepened global communication beyond expectations. Although 90 per cent of world computers are concentrated in the hands of 10 per cent of the world's population, the growth of Internet users to over 200 million has created a global network that transcends national boundaries. The far-reaching implications of the communication revolution for governance at all levels is only now beginning to be felt in such developments as the international campaign to ban landmines and the worldwide movement to support the Chiappa resistance in Mexico.²³

The post-Cold War (dis)order, 1989–present

The end of the Cold War in 1989 ushered in a new era that is still in flux. Diversification of global institutions outside the UN system, the rise of new ethnic and nationalist movements, and the entry of China, Russia and Eastern Europe into the world markets prompted calls for the restructuring of global governance institutions. However, instead of accommodating emerging interests and voices by democratizing those institutions, the great powers have continued a policy of benign neglect, thereby contributing to conflicts that threaten international peace and security.

While the practice of international politics has not substantially changed, the discourse has. The UN-sponsored world conferences of the 1980s and 1990s have sought to develop priorities for the coming decades²⁴ on such issues as children's and women's rights, the environment, population, social development, crime and racism.²⁵ Some, like the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1990 World Summit for Children, resulted in treaties that set international standards for child protection. States that are parties to these treaties can now be held accountable. Other conferences, including the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development and the 1995 World Summit for Social Development have all helped to set guidelines and rules which provide a basis for the further development of global governance. This is not to

say that such conferences and gatherings have been devoid of conflict or the pursuit of narrowly defined self-interest. The 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was partially side-tracked from its main agenda by the US and Israeli walk-out on grounds of alleged anti-Zionist domination of the conference.

The UN system has thus become the arena for global discourse but also global contestation. Without the co-operation of great powers UN discourse can rarely translate into practice the emerging normative and legal framework. The NGOs also are contributing to the rules that reflect the new priorities. On the forefront of promoting international law, the Institute of International Law began in the 1990s to focus its work on human rights. Transparency International and the Convention Combating Corruption were both formed in 1997. Transparency International, a Berlin-based global anti-corruption organization, publishes an annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI), ranking the extent of individual states' corruption. Publication of the CPI may increase awareness of the corruption of states and politicians, but it will not necessarily deter them. The international community needs to set standards for corporate and state behaviour in financial transactions and enforce them perhaps by using the mechanisms of the WTO. The politics of shame, helpful though it is, may not be enough.

Beyond globalism, the last few decades have witnessed several other striking trends: regionalism, nationalism, localism, environmentalism, feminism and revivalism. Their implications will be more fully explored in subsequent chapters. Suffice it here to say that the growth of TNCs, IGOs, NGOs and alternative government organizations (AGOs) in each of these arenas has greatly magnified the competing pressures impinging on global governance. As the international system grows in complexity, the abuse of loopholes via economic crime and political corruption has become increasingly feasible. Corporate tax evasion, the speculative mania culminating in the 1997 Asian financial debacle, and the growth of crony and mafia capitalism in Indonesia and Russia respectively are clear instances of such abuse.²⁶

Yet there are also positive signs of expanding international co-operation. These include the 1989 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the 1995 formation of the WTO with its rules for the adjudication of trade conflicts, the 1997 Kyoto Treaty on Climate Change, the 1998 establishment of the International Court of Criminal Justice to prosecute crimes against humanity, and the 1997 Treaty to Ban Landmines. All such achievements, however, ultimately require the co-operation of major powers. To the extent that these powers, notably the United States, Russia and China, have refused to become signatories (for example, to the Landmines Treaty) or have withdrawn their support (the United States from the Kyoto Treaty), the prospects for global governance are thereby diminished.

Globalization and its discontents

Despite the enormous complexity of the global system, certain historical trends in the last five centuries can be identified, including global economic integration,

cultural fragmentation, and political democratization. These trends have largely taken place under the auspices of capitalism. Understood as a method of commodity production for the market rather than self-consumption, capitalism is certainly much older than its European manifestations.²⁷ However, with the scientific, technological and industrial revolutions in modern Europe, capitalism became a dominant global system spreading to all parts of the globe. It assumed a variety of institutional forms that have ranged from liberalism to state communism, fascism or Nazism, and communitarian socialism.

What is now emerging globally is a regime that goes beyond the historical features of previous capitalist regimes. Rather than adopt the prevailing political ideologies of territorial states, the new regime operates in a global arena largely beyond the reach of states. It coexists with the national capitalist regimes in a grudging partnership, but its global reach and dominance give it a power and impetus that transcends them.

The new regime may be characterized by the prevalence of three macrotrends: economic globalization, cultural fragmentation and political democratization. Globalization is primarily led by the TNCs which organize, operate and promote the global economy. A TNC typically operates in a large number of countries with centralized strategic planning and decentralized operations. TNCs, also referred to as multinational or global corporations, operate in every sector of the economy, including manufacturing, services and finance. The Commission on Global Governance has estimated their numbers to be around 37,000. Although in the postwar period German, Japanese, Korean and Chinese corporations have reached the ranks of TNCs, these remain primarily Anglo-American in origin. On the other hand, by virtue of joint ventures, interlocking directorships, staff composition, and operations, TNCs increasingly transcend national boundaries and loyalties.

The processes of globalization led by the TNCs are undermining the autonomy and authority of states while fragmenting the population around competing class, status and ethnic groups that gain or lose from the outcome. The territorial state system is thus under strain from both the apex and the base of the global social structure. However, rising income and education are also leading to a third process, namely democratization, led by an emergent global civil society.

Close to 40,000 TNCs, some operating in as many as 150 countries, are the engines of transnational capital. This enables them to influence national regulation and to seek the highest possible profits by locating in low-wage, low-rent, low-tax, and low-regulation countries and localities.²⁸ The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) would have allowed TNCs to sue states for any violation of agreements. In the late 1990s, the WTO proposed MAI and then dropped the idea in the face of opposition. In the words of Renato Ruggiero, WTO's director, MAI aimed at establishing 'the constitution of a single global economy'. It would have thus reinforced a global regime of trade, investment and development that favoured transnational capital. From a neo-liberal perspective, this regime can be viewed as a progressive force in transferring science, technology, management and employment to the less-developed world. From the perspective of the marginalized – a perspective articulated at successive demonstrations against

globalization beginning with the Seattle protests in 1999 – the transnational agencies must be held accountable to democratic forces. To keep the global capitalist regime socially and ecologically responsible, IGOs, states and NGOs must monitor, regulate and counteract its power.²⁹

The globalization of capital is being challenged on several fronts, by regionalism,³⁰ nationalism, ethno-nationalism, feminism, environmentalism and religious revivalism. Despite the rhetoric of ‘end of history’,³¹ ‘triumph of liberal democracy’, and ‘clash of civilizations’,³² the new world order, which replaced the Cold War, may be best described as a *Cold Peace*. Broadly speaking, Cold Peace can be characterized as rivalry between the trans-state global forces of global capitalism and the fragmented forces of its critics. As the gaps in wealth, income and knowledge within and among states widen, a cold and unstable peace threatens to erupt with rising intensity into flames of violence and terrorism.

On the other hand, those situated at the margins represent a largely disorganized collection of associations and nations which are attempting to resist, change, or otherwise counter, directly or indirectly, the influence of global capitalism on the institutions and processes of global governance. This cluster of forces consists of two main groups: state and non-state actors. The number of states has increased from about 70 in 1945, to about 200 in the late 1990s. Most of the dissatisfied states belong to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), launched at the Bandung Conference of 1955. The group has since gathered in numerous conferences and most recently (1998) at the heads-of-state level in Durban, South Africa. Despite its considerable heterogeneity and disunity, this group of states, whose membership considerably overlaps with the Group of 77, shares a common colonial or semi-colonial past, and is struggling for economic development and political democracy. Although membership has grown to 133, and much has changed, not least the end of the bipolar confrontation, the name has been retained primarily because of its historic significance. The group was largely instrumental in the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and has since bargained with limited success for special treatment of the LDCs in matters of trade, investment and finance.

Other international interest groups, including OPEC and the Group of 15 (actually 17 developing countries), have been formed to devise and propose alternative policies with respect to prices, production and export, and the broader development agenda. Although OPEC provides a countervailing power *vis-à-vis* the petroleum importing countries and companies, its success has been chequered. While OPEC succeeded during the 1970s in raising the price of crude oil from \$1.80 to \$24 per barrel, falling prices in the 1990s meant that oil income was now below the levels recorded in the 1960s. In 1998–99, OPEC succeeded in reversing the trend by means of production controls, but rising prices of industrial imports and services have systematically stripped away much of the oil income. The effective transfer of ‘foreign aid’ from LDCs to MDCs were estimated by the *Economist* to be around \$60 billion per annum.

The label ‘non-state actors’ usually refers to the growing number of NGOs (currently estimated at over 30,000), which point to the emergence of a global

civil-society movement. NGOs include such progressive associations as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Indigenous Peoples' Movement, Campaign to Ban Landmines, and Abolition 2000. Civil society also includes such conservative organizations as the political action committees of the global military-industrial complex, the Christian Coalition, the Trilateral Commission, Commission on Global Governance, and the World Economic Forum. Civil-society forces are thus not uniformly progressive or reactionary. In addition, there is an unknown number of armed AGOs that work openly or clandestinely for a variety of objectives, ranging in legitimacy from drug trafficking and money laundering³³ to national liberation for such repressed groups as the Kurds, Kosovars, Palestinians, Tibetans and Uighurs.

Politically, global capitalism has directly and indirectly subverted the regulatory functions of territorial states to achieve a degree of lop-sided growth that has exacerbated economic and informational gaps within and among nations. While democratic processes are often circumvented through campaign contributions that buy off politicians, the rule of undemocratic states is pre-empted through a combination of inducements and constraints. Indirectly, the commercial media's uncritical promotion of neo-liberal ideology fosters the impression that there is only one cultural basis for self-identity, namely fame and fortune. The central message of global advertising is that money and consumption are the keys to personal success and fulfilment. Neo-liberal ideology has thus combined with acquisitive individualism to justify *commodity fetishism*.

In reaction to this discourse and practice, those at the periphery have resorted to cultural politics and *identity fetishism*. The post-Cold War rise of ethnic, religious and nationalist movements around the world suggests that the neo-liberal project will continue to face increasing fragmentation and resistance from those who are marginalized and excluded from its fruits. James Mittelman among others has provided a thoughtful analysis of the dialectic of domination and resistance as it operates under the globalization regime.³⁴ In that dialectic lies perhaps the key to the protracted, borderless global war of terrorism and counter-terrorism in which innocent civilians are the prime victims. The phenomenon may be viewed as an incipient World War III. Given the increasing proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),³⁵ this century may come to witness tragedies even greater than those of the twentieth century. Unless a democratic dialogue on global governance is placed high on the international agenda, the spiral of violence may move towards dysfunction or even system breakdown.

The emerging imbalances

September 11, 2001 will be remembered as a defining moment in world history. The world's only superpower, historically protected by two vast oceans, was no longer immune to the new weapons of terror. As the weapon of the weak, terrorism proved a deadly one. The strong were now seen, and saw themselves, as vulnerable.

The root cause of violence may be found in the alienation, dualism and antagonism generated by systemic marginalization of vast segments of the world population. However, every major tragedy brings with it an opportunity for reflection and reconstruction. Historical leaps often result from major human disasters. Societies often learn through pain and suffering. The League of Nations resulted from World War I. The UN emerged out of World War II. This time, the catalyst may be global terrorism.

Despite their profound differences, orthodox liberal, marxist and religious fundamentalist views of power have one thing in common. They are all captive to the Machiavellian ethics which rests on the separation of ends and means. Theorizing at the onset of the modern world, Machiavelli – and since then the school of international politics known as realism – argued that the state stands above morality. Relatively self-contained and possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the state, we were told, should be free to pursue its ends by all available means.

The new global reality is sharply at odds with this traditional view. The world is economically interdependent, politically entwined, and territorially vulnerable to hegemonic, resistance, terrorist and criminal movements. Separating ends and means is no longer politically or ethically feasible. In the struggle against terrorism a new global politics and ethics must be learned. The new world view will perhaps receive its moral and political inspiration from the pioneers of non-violent political action, notably Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel. In this view, ends and means are part of an unbroken chain. All political institutions (states, corporations and voluntary associations) must act in accordance with the law which itself must reflect widely accepted moral precepts. In a globalized world, such precepts and laws must be carefully negotiated among different traditions of civility.

Economically, creeping world recession has demonstrated how a continuing lack of transnational regulation can lead to economic breakdown in the most vulnerable countries (witness Indonesia). The Bretton Woods institutions were not designed for the accelerating scale and velocity of international economic activity which followed the privatization and deregulation policies of the 1980s and 1990s. By continuing to preach the gospel of neo-liberal capitalism without regard to its social and political consequences, these institutions have sometimes exacerbated economic downturns.³⁶ In addition to their regulatory role, the G7, OECD, EU, ASEAN, APEC, OPEC and other economic groupings have attempted with mixed success to set agendas and intervene on behalf of special group interests. But the new capitalist states of East Asia and Eastern Europe have yet to develop institutional defences against the internal and external excesses of primitive accumulation. Such excesses have come to be known as ‘robber baron’ capitalism in the United States, ‘crony capitalism’ in East Asia and ‘mafia capitalism’ in Russia. It is not just that since 1950 world trade has increased 16-fold.³⁷ According to the IMF, between \$500 billion to \$1.5 trillion (or 5 per cent of gross world product) may now be laundered every year. The result of such plundering by design has been called ‘casino capitalism’.³⁸ Susan Strange predicted the Asian

financial crisis of 1997 a decade earlier by identifying the causes of bank failures, financial fraud, political corruption, money laundering and the general volatility in world financial markets. The rapid globalization of financial markets during the 1980s and 1990s in the absence of effective global regulation was itself prompted by the rise of global capitalism. In search of profits, TNCs adroitly played states off against one another as they sought to take advantage of tax holidays, low wages and lax government regulation.

Population growth and labour-saving technological change have in the meantime created pockets of structural unemployment in various regions. In the United States, about 20 per cent of the population is considered not only structurally unemployed but also unemployable in the current technological environment. Corporate mergers, acquisitions, downsizing, outsourcing and layoffs are constantly adding to the army of unemployed and underemployed.³⁹ Moreover, an ageing population in the MDCs and the demographic explosion in the LDCs means that large numbers of people will increasingly need to be supported by welfare or face an unpleasant future. Dramatic increases of 6 to 9 per cent in the workforce in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America will present enormous challenges to employment opportunities.

The addition of women to the labour force is at the same time changing gender relations. By the year 2010, more than 40 per cent of the paid workforce will be women,⁴⁰ although, as Human Development Reports data indicate, the situation varies enormously from country to country. Recent evidence suggests that economic power does not automatically lead to social and political power. It does, however, create the necessary conditions for the transformation of gender relations.⁴¹ Women's rights have been violated in three main areas. First, discrimination in economic, social and political opportunities has historically hampered women's progress. Secondly, inequality in family life has limited women's rights in marriage, divorce and reproductive decision-making. Thirdly, gender-based violence in times of war and peace has dishonoured women's dignity and security. Changing norms, laws and international agreements on women's rights to security, reproduction, education and employment are gradually improving their conditions. But as the recent reversal of women's rights in certain societies (notably Afghanistan under the Taliban) demonstrates, without international support domestic struggles are not guaranteed durable success.

Environmentally, the scale and speed of industrial expansion dramatizes the deficiencies in existing institutional mechanisms to protect the global commons. As a consequence, the biosphere, air, land, water and other limited resources are under increasing pressure. Rapid expansion in major growth poles has failed to protect the quality of life as reflected in people's health and well-being. The scale of the Malthusian trap is awesome: demographic trends indicate growing demands on the global commons, making it ever more difficult to provide even the necessities of life. Furthermore, the risk of major environmental catastrophes (for example, ozone depletion, nuclear accidents, acid rain, global warming, drug-resistant microbes, epidemics) is rising. Any of these outcomes could compound

global economic or political instabilities, economic or class conflict and terrorism, and might eventually provoke systemic breakdown.⁴² Technological capabilities represent a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they hold the awesome potential to create a post-scarcity civilization of abundance. On the other hand, they enable large-scale genocide, unparalleled repression, and even human extinction. Whether the capabilities are put to positive or negative use depends on technological design and application. The absence of democratic governance allows corporate irresponsibility to combine with political corruption to produce deeply felt social discontent that breeds political extremism. Given appropriate conditions, such extremism can in turn unleash nuclear, biological, chemical or cyber terrorism and counter-terrorism.⁴³

The only realistic antidote to these possibilities is democratic decision-making. Democratic practices introduce a system of checks and balances which provides early warning on societal problems, together with increased transparency, monitoring and accountability of both public and private institutions. The future of the world system depends on its capacity to endow global regulatory institutions with these democratic practices in order to counterbalance the unfettered power of national states, global capital, or criminal organizations. The task must be undertaken with full participation of the three major stakeholders in global governance: states, TNCs and civil societies, with the world media serving as the nervous system in the global body politic (see Figure 1.1). While states can co-operatively provide for international peace and security, market forces are essential to the production of employment, wealth and income. Civil societies and communication networks, by contrast, must monitor the performance of the system, identify its strengths and weaknesses, and mobilize the public for necessary reforms. Democratic checks and balances at the global level are now largely conspicuous by their absence. Their institution is a *sine qua non* of world survival.

As previously noted, the international community has since 1945 made considerable strides in the development of global governance institutions. However, an even more rapid movement in the globalization of international trade, investment, finance, transportation, communication, tourism, terrorism, crime and arms-trafficking has created what might be called a legal and organizational lag. The development of international law and institutions has not kept pace with the world's rapidly changing technological and economic landscape. A glaring gap has emerged in terms of global reach and power between the *de facto* and *de jure* institutions of global governance. The *de facto* institutions consist of the corporate organizations which dominate the economic and financial arena, and the major states (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, Germany, Japan, India and France) which largely control the political arena. The *de jure* institutions comprise the IGOs and the myriad of declarations and treaties that have been issued and signed by states on human rights, peace and security, environment, humanitarian law and much else. In certain policy areas, NGOs are attempting to bridge the gap between political reality and pious exhortation. However, their reach and leverage pale in comparison with the power and resources of global corporations and major states.

Notes

1. M.P. Ryan, *Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1998), pp.8–10.
2. J. Mander and E. Goldsmith, *The Case against the Global Economy: and for a Turn Toward the Local* (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1996), chs 11 and 12.
3. C.N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.3.
4. IB History Page, 'Congress of Vienna Personalities', available online at: <http://kanga.pvhs.chico.k12.ca.us/~bsilva/projects/congress/vienpers.html> (6 July 1999).
5. 'The Monroe Doctrine', available online at: <http://www.uiowa.edu/~c030162/Common/Handouts/POTUS/Monroe.html> (6 July 1999).
6. IB History Page, 'Concert of Europe: Overview', available online at: <http://www.pvhs.chico.k12.ca.us/~bsilva/projects/concert/concessy.html> (6 July 1999).
7. 'The Monroe Doctrine', Encyclopedia Americana Online (EAO), available online at: <http://gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/side/mondoc.html> (6 July 1999).
8. L.S. Stavrianos, *A Global History: From Prehistory to the Present* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991), p.457.
9. A. Natsios, 'NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?', in T. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds), *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p.73.
10. Encyclopedia Britannica Online (EBO), 'Institute of International Law', available online at: <http://members.eb.com/bol/topic?eu=99364&sctn=1> (1 July 1999).
11. PVHS, 'Effects of WWI', available online at: http://www.pvhs.chico.k12.ca.us/~bsilva/projects/great_war/effects.htm (6 July 1999).
12. All amounts in this volume are given in US dollars unless otherwise indicated.
13. B. Eichengreen and P. Kenen, *Managing the World Economy – 50 Years After Bretton Woods* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), p.11.
14. EBO, 'United Nations', available online at: <http://www.members.eb.com/bol/topic?eu=115666&sctn=2> (21 August 1999).
15. P.M. Sweezy, *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (London: NLB; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976).
16. P.A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957).
17. A.G. Frank, *The Development of Underdevelopment* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
18. Ibid.
19. The dramatic success of the Asian tigers in breaking away from the cycle of dependency has led a number of critical theorists to revise their views, see M. Blomstrom and B. Hettne, *Development Theory in Transition – the Dependency Debate and Beyond: Third World Responses* (London: Zed Books, 1984); A. So, *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World Systems Theories* (Newbury Parks: Sage, 1990).
20. Murphy, p.7.
21. H. Hudson, *Global Connections: International Telecommunications Infrastructure and Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), p.44.
22. EBO, 'Internet', available online at: <http://www.members.eb.com/bol/topic?eu=1460&sctn=1> (8 July 1999).
23. M. Tehranian, *Global Communication and World Politics: Domination, Development, and Discourse* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp.162–5; for global statistics on the Internet, see the *Economist* Survey, available online at: <http://www.glbreach.com/globstats/> (24 June 2000).

24. United Nations, *The World Conferences* (New York: UNDPI, 1997).
25. ILO, 'Follow-up on the World Summit for Social Development', available online at: <<http://www-ilo-mirror.who.or.jp/public/english/60empfor/polemp/prog4-2.htm>> (19 July 1999).
26. See Part II.
27. A.G. Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, Press, 1998).
28. 'Disappearing Taxes', the *Economist*, 31 May 1997.
29. M.A. Chen, 'Engendering World Conferences', in Weiss and Gordenker.
30. C. Peck, *Sustainable Peace: the Role of the United Nations and Regional Organizations in Conflict Prevention* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
31. F. Fukuyama, 'The End of History', *National Interest* (Summer 1989).
32. S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993).
33. For an analysis of the global criminal economy, see M. Castells, *The Information Society: Economy, Society, and Culture*, Vol.3 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), ch.3; J. Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), ch.11.
34. Ibid.
35. See chapters 11 and 12.
36. Notably in East Asia, see Part II.
37. 'Survey of World Trade', the *Economist*, 3 October 1998.
38. S. Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
39. R. Rifkin, *The End of Work: the Decline of the Global Labor Force and Dawn of the Post-Market Era* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1995).
40. I. Pearson (ed.), *The Atlas of the Future* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.70–1.
41. UNDP, *Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.117.
42. Pearson, pp.18–19.
43. Ibid., pp.30–1.

Index

- Abolition 2000, 22
accountability, principle of, 80, 85,
135, 139–40, 157, 174, 232, 240,
243–4, 258–9, 268, 273
Action Canada Network, 154
adjudication, 12, 166, 238
see also Permanent Court of Justice,
International Court of Justice
Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPANET), 18
Afghanistan, 24, 41, 50–1
Akyuz, Yilmaz, 140
Albright, Madeleine, 60, 204
Algeria, 35, 50
Allied Powers, 13–14, 79
Al-Qaeda, 51
alternative government organizations
(AGOs), 19, 22, 60–1
amalgamation policies, 42
Amazon rain forests, 7
Amnesty International, 8, 22, 40, 174
An Agenda for Peace (1992), 166,
212–13
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace
(1995), 168
anarchists, 69
Angola, 226
Annan, Kofi, 166–7, 169, 177, 223,
233, 241, 247, 259
anthrax, 200, 203
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 64,
181, 190
'anti-deficit radicalism', 92
apartheid, 32, 46, 59, 190
Arab League, 279
arbitrageurs, 96
arbitration, 12, 166
see also Permanent Court of
Arbitration
Argentina, 48, 58, 107, 190
arms control, *see* Disarmament
ASEAN, *see* Association of South East
Asian Nations
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 279
Asia-Europe summits (ASEM), 154
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 155,
259
Asia Pacific Civil Society Forum, 269
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), 23, 39, 153, 175, 259, 279
assimilationist policies, 42
Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN), 23, 39–40, 71,
172, 175, 183, 265, 267, 269, 279
associations, 21, 64
Atlantic Charter, 14
Attali, Jacques, 33
Aum Shinrikio, 200, 203, 205
Aung San Suu Kyi, 59
Australia, 46, 142, 172, 266
Australia Group, 201, 206
Austria, 13, 142
authoritarianism, 56
Axis Powers, 6, 14

Bahrain dispute, 171
baht (Thai), 109, 119, 122–3
Baker, James, 203
balance of power, 9, 33, 39, 198
Balkans, 172
Bandung Conference, 21
bandwagon effect, 85
Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), 13, 135–6, 151, 155
Bank of America, 111
Baran, Paul, 16
Barbados, 48
Barber, Benjamin, 45
Basel Capital Accord, 92, 136–7, 140
Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 134, 140
Basel Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision, 132
Basque dispute, 168
Belgium, 12, 142
Bell, Daniel, 56
Bello, Walden, 120, 122
Biafra dispute, 171
Bible belt, 50
bin Laden, Osama, 45, 51
biological weapons, 182, 185, 198–208
Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC), 181, 187, 190–1,
199–208
bipolarity, 165, 213
Blair, Tony, 45, 133–4

- Bonanno, Alessandro, 90
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16, 35, 41, 214, 243, 248
- General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 265
- Implementation Force (IFOR), 265
- Stabilization Force (SFOR), 265
- Bougainville, 232
- bourgeoisie, 56, 91–3
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 166, 168–9, 177, 212, 223, 266
- see also An Agenda for Peace*
- Brahimi Report*, 170, 213, 235, 242, 244–5, 248
- Brazil, 39, 85, 94, 97, 107, 185, 190, 260
- Bretton Woods Conference, 79
- Bretton Woods institutions, xvi, 17, 23, 112, 131, 134, 155–6, 261, 263
- see also International Monetary Fund*, World Bank
- Britain, 6, 9, 14, 78, 142
- democracy, 56
- mass media, 61
- Northern Ireland crisis, 171
- Security Council and, 260
- withdrawal from UNESCO, 16
- Brown, Gordon, 95, 134
- 'bubble' economy, 119–22, 147–8
- Burma, *see* Myanmar
- Burundi, 16, 232
- Bush, George H.W., 39–40, 50, 199, 201
- Bush Administration, 201
- Bush (Jr), George W., 50, 203–4
- Bush Administration, 86, 181, 201
- business cycles, 106
- Cambodia, 172, 214, 226, 248
- Canada, 41, 48, 86–7, 142, 148, 189, 281
- Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 185
- capital, 82
- controls, 131–2, 139, 149–50, 155
- mobility, 78, 80, 82, 86–7
- vicious flows of, 79, 85–6
- virtuous flows of, 79
- capital-account convertibility, 94, 127–8, 157
- capital-account liberalization (CAL), *see under* liberalization
- capitalism, 20
- casino, 23
- corporate, 6
- crony, 19, 23, 117, 120, 132
- global, 28–9, 31–2, 68, 82
- laissez-faire, 67, 104
- mafia, 19, 23
- national, 6
- robber baron, 23
- state, 5
- carry trade, 120–1
- Carter, Jimmy, 50
- Catholic Church, 8
- Cayman Islands, 86
- Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 40
- Chad, 214, 226
- Chandrasekhar, C.P., 131
- Chase-Dunn, Cristopher, 30
- Chase Manhattan, 111
- Chechnya, 35, 39
- chemical weapons, 182, 185, 198–208
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 181, 187, 190–1, 201–8
- Cheney, Dick, 199
- Childers, Erskine, 246
- Chile, 48, 107, 124–5, 138
- China (People's Republic of), 3, 5, 7, 13, 19, 39, 56, 99, 109, 226, 266, 279
- capital flows, 95–6
- democratic movement in, 66
- economic growth, 47
- entry into world markets, 18
- human rights violations, 38
- landmines, 184
- nuclear weapons, 185
- Chirac, Jacques, 133
- Chossudovsky, M., 135
- Christian Coalition (USA), 22, 50
- Churchill, Sir Winston, 14
- Citicorp, 111
- civil society, 150–2, 268–9
- evolution, 64
- functions, 152–3
- global, 11, 17, 40, 64, 159–60, 255, 268–9, 278
- organizations (CSOs), xiv, 150–2, 175, 184, 186, 192, 238, 268–9
- in relation to the state and market, 58–60
- 'clash of civilizations' thesis, 21, 39
- class structure (global), 83

- Clinton, William, 40, 45, 47, 50, 133–4, 200–1, 203
 Clinton Administration, 16, 59, 200–1, 204
- Cold Peace, 21
- Cold War, 5, 226
- colonialism, 6, 10, 32, 41, 277
- Commission on Global Governance, 20, 22, 87, 185, 257, 261
- commodity fetishism, 22, 37, 45, 50
- Common Frontiers project, 154
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 39, 71
see also Russia
- communication, 65–6
- communitarianism, 56
- complex emergencies, 217
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 181, 190
- computers, 18, 65
- Concert of Europe, 9–10
- conciliation, 175, 238
- Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), *see* Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
- conferences (UN-sponsored), 18
- Conference on the Environment and Development (Earth Summit), 18, 48, 184
- Conference on Population and Development, 18
- Conference on Women, 47
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, 18
- Framework Convention on Climate Change, 18
- Millennium Summit, 159, 169
- World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, 19, 64
- World Conference on Human Rights, 18
- World Summit for Children, 18
- World Summit for Social Development, 18, 261
- confidence-building measures (CBMs), 166, 183, 190
- conflict
 inter-state, 168, 213, 231
 intra-state, 165, 213, 231
 prevention, 165–77, 265, 269
 resolution, 165
 symmetric versus asymmetric, 167
 transformation, 173, 225
- Confucius, 55
- Congo (Democratic Republic of the), 230
- consent, principle of, 233, 237
- Consultative Assembly (proposed), 156, 258–9, 262, 265
- Contingent Credit Line (CCL), *see under* International Monetary Fund
- Contributing Forces Panel (proposed), 244
- Convention Combating Corruption, 19
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, 18
- co-operative zone, 237
- copyright, 10, 31–2, 61, 68
see also intellectual property
- corporation (as a business organization), 7
see also transnational corporations
- corruption, 19, 129
- Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 19
- Costa Rica, 48
- Council for Petitions (proposed), 222
- Council for Security and Co-operation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), 269
- Cox, Robert, 276
- credit-rating agencies, 135, 137
- crime, organized, 29, 255, 268, 276
- Crimean War, 10
- crimes against humanity, 233
- Cuba, 11, 48, 56
- Cuban missile crisis, 171
- Culpeper, R., 141
- 'cult of impotence', 77, 83, 87
- cultural fragmentation, 20
- 'culture of contentment', 81
- currency
 crashes, 7
 depreciation of, 99, 107, 111, 122–3, 128
- Cyprus, 225, 231
- Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 194
- debt, 107, 159
- Declaration of Independence (USA), 56
- Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (France), 56
- decolonization, 45
- demilitarized zones, 166
- democracy, 25, 36, 49, 55–8, 63–7, 150, 232, 256, 268
 'cosmopolitan', 63, 69, 256, 273

- democracy – *continued*
 direct, 56
 global, 55–8
 liberal, 69
 long-term prevention and, 167
 media and, 66–7
 representative, 64
 democratization, 20, 45, 59, 71–2, 84,
 176–7, 225, 269, 273, 282
 Denmark, 107, 245, 281
 Department of Peace Operations
 (proposed), 240, 247
 Dependency School of Economic
 Development, 16
 deregulation, 132
 competitive, 93
 financial, 109
 derivatives, 86
 Desert Storm, 166
 see also Gulf War
 determinism
 historical, 77, 83
 technological, 65
 de Tocqueville, A., 64
 Deutsch, John, 201
 development, 158
 preventive, 216
 stages of, 52, 92, 281
 sustainable (human and social), 49,
 131, 146–9, 152–5, 216, 237,
 272
 Dexter-White, J., 79, 85–6
 dictatorship(s), 31, 50, 59, 69
 Dillon, J., 142
 diplomacy
 citizen, 173
 creative/celebrity, 173
 first-track traditional, 171
 preventive, 166, 169, 171, 237–8
 second-track, 173
 third-track, 173
 disarmament (and arms control), 214,
 234
 biological and chemical, 198–208
 nuclear, 181–95
 preventive, 167, 178 n.12
 see also United Nations
Discriminate Deterrence, 199
 division of labour (international), 6,
 10, 16, 29
 dual-purpose (biological and chemical)
 agents, 206–7
 dual-use technologies, 237
 Durch, William, 223
 early warning, 166, 172, 174, 216,
 235–6, 267
 East Asian Monetary Fund (proposed),
 154
 Eastern Economic Association, 140
 East Timor, 172, 214, 230, 232, 248, 266
 Eatwell, John, 147
 Economic Co-operation Organization
 (ECO), 71
 Economic and Social Council,
 see under United Nations
 Economic and Social Security Council
 (proposed), 156, 257, 261–2
 economic fundamentals, 118–19, 124,
 130
 economic stabilization, 85–6, 92, 113
Economist, the, 21, 61, 129
 edge cities, 46
 effectiveness, 232, 243, 262
 efficiency, 233
 egalitarianism, 56
 Egypt, 35, 50, 185
 Eichengreen, B., 125
 Electoral Commission (proposed), 258
 El Salvador, 248
 empires, 8, 30, 45
encaje system (Chile), 138
 ‘end of history’ thesis, 21, 77, 99
 Engels, Friedrich, 6
 environment, 24, 64, 216
 see also pollution, UN
 Environmental Programme
 environmentalism, 48–9
 epistemic communities, 280
 ethics of social responsibility, 49
 Ethiopia, 13
 ethnic cleansing, 239
 euro, 133, 153
 European Monetary Union (EMU), 153
 European Union (EU), 23, 39–40, 59,
 71, 109, 153, 260, 265, 269, 279
 Commission, 170
 conflict prevention and, 168, 170–1,
 175
 Parliament, 258
 Yugoslav conflict and, 172
 Evans, Gareth, 166, 171
 exchange rate, 78, 108–9, 125, 128
 exchange-rate mechanism (Europe),
 140
 fact-finding, 166, 175, 216, 235–6
 Falk, Richard, 71, 275
 fascism, 58, 79

- Federation of International Institutions, 14
- Feldstein, Martin, 113, 157
- feminism, 47–8
- fidelity investments, 118
- Finance One, 120, 122–3
- Financial Advisory Committee (proposed), 263
- financial crises, 107
- Asian, 56, 85, 93, 95, 97, 106–15, 129, 132, 136–7
 - Brazilian, 132
 - Mexican, 140
 - Russian, 132
- Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 134–6, 140
- Financial Times*, 61
- Finland, 107, 142, 281
- Fischer, Joschka, 133
- Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), 183, 190
- Force Contributors Committee (proposed), 244, 246–7
- Foreign Affairs*, 61
- foreign direct investment (FDI), 77, 92, 95, 97–8, 138, 149–50
- Foreign Policy*, 61
- France, 6, 87, 142
- criticism of US unilateralism, 133
 - democracy, 56
 - nuclear weapons, 185
 - Revolution, *see under* revolutions
 - United Nations and, 260
- Frank, André Gunder, 16, 131
- free trade, 158
- Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA), 153–4
- Freud, Sigmund, 51
- 'Friends of the UN Secretary-General', notion of, 222
- Fukuyama, Francis, 99
- fundamentalism, 50, 64
- see also* neo-traditionalism
- G7, 23, 61, 84, 87, 134–5, 146–7, 160, 175, 276
- G10, 136
- G-22, 109, 139
- Gaia Hypothesis, 49
- Galbraith, J.K., 81
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 23
- Gates, Bill, 45
- Gender Empowerment Index (GEI), 48
- Gender-related Development Index (GDI), 48
- gender relations, 24, 47
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 6–7, 16–17
- Uruguay Round, 205
 - see also* World Trade Organization
- General Assembly, *see under* United Nations
- General Postal Union, 10
- General Staff for Peace Operations (proposed), 244, 245–7
- Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 246
- Geneva General Act for the Settlement of Disputes, 12
- genocidal practices, 56, 239
- 'geopolitical closure', 275
- Gephardt, Richard, 38
- Germany, 6, 14, 133, 142
- during the inter-war years, 12–13, 58
 - United Nations and, 16, 260
- Ghosh, Jayati, 131
- Giddens, Anthony, 90, 134
- Global Governance Reform Project (GGRP), xiii
- globalism, 37–40
- globalization, 71–2, 77, 79, 82, 90, 104
- demonstrations against, 21, 35, 160
- Goizueta, R.C., 67–8
- Goldman Sachs, 112
- gold standard, 12, 15, 78, 82
- good offices, 175, 216
- governance, 241
- global, 87, 255, 257: *de facto* (institutions/regimes of), xvi, 8, 25, 29–31; *de jure* (institutions/regimes of), xvi, 8, 15, 25, 276; evolution of, 8–19; stakeholders in, 60
 - humane, 63–5
 - tiers of, xv, 59, 148, 172, 177, 256, 268, 278
- Grameen Bank, 65
- Gramsci, Antonio, 280
- Great Crash, 5, 87
- Great Depression, 5, 13–14, 85, 87
- Greece (Ancient), 56
- Greenpeace, 22, 40
- Greens, the, 49
- Greenspan, Alan, 133, 147
- Griffith-Jones, Stephany, 125
- Group of 15, 21
- Group of 20, 135

- Group of 77, 21
- Guatemala, 50
- Guinea, 171
- Gulf War, 39, 84, 171, 176, 199, 203, 225, 278
- Haiti, 214, 224, 248
- Hall, T.D., 30
- Hammurabi, 55
- Hang Seng index, 94
- Hanson, Pauline, 46
- Hardt, Michael, 99
- haute finance*, 78
- Havel, Vaclav, 23
- Hawaii, 11
- hedge funds, 85–6, 96–7, 123, 133, 135, 137, 149
 - see also* portfolio investors, speculators
- Held, David, 69, 71, 256
- Helms, Jesse, 38
- Helsinki Summit, 170
- herd behaviour, 98, 117–19, 124–5, 129
- highly leveraged institutions (HLIs), 135, 137, 140
- Hirsch, Fred, 84
- historical-structural approach, 275
- Hobsbawm, Eric, 79
- Holocaust, 34, 41, 59
- Holy Alliance, 8, 12
- Hong Kong, 94, 135, 142
- Hormat, Robert, 112
- hot money, 79, 96, 107
- Human Development Index (HDI), 48
- humanitarian intervention, 87, 218, 230, 233, 239
- humanitarian law, international, *see under* international law
- Human Poverty Index, 81
- human rights, 19, 38, 49, 169, 221, 233, 235, 237, 241, 242, 246–7, 272, 277, 280
- Human Rights Watch, 174
- human security, *see under* security
- Huntley, J.R., 71
- Ibn Khaldun, 30
- identity fetishism, 22, 45, 50
- IMF, *see* International Monetary Fund
- impact assessment, 167, 176, 232, 238–40
- Impact Assessment Office (proposed), 240
- impartiality, principle of, 266
- imperialism, 30–4, 42
 - agrarian, 30
 - industrial, 31
 - informatic, 31–2, 34, 71
- INCORE, 174
- Independent Review Tribunal (proposed), 239
- India, 3, 30, 35, 39, 41, 50, 99, 107, 181, 184–5, 260, 279
- Indigenous Peoples' Movement, 22
- Indonesia, 7, 19, 23, 31–2, 39, 92, 107, 110, 171–2, 232
- industry(ies)
 - copyright, 7
 - high-tech, 6, 32
 - labour-intensive, 6
 - low-tech, 32
 - money-management, 118–19
- inequality, 80–1
- inflation, 80
- Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (proposed), 170, 235
- Institute of International Law, 12, 19
- institutional investors, *see* portfolio investors
- Integrated Task Force (proposed), 244, 246
- integration, 19–20, 42, 265
- intellectual property, 10, 205
 - trade-related, 7–8
 - see also* copyright, licences, patents, trademarks
- interest groups, 55
- interest rates, 85–6, 99, 106, 108, 113, 119–20, 139
- inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), 13
- Inter-Hemispheric Social Alliance, 154
- International Alert, 174
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 269
- International Bankruptcy Court (proposed), 159
- International Chamber of Commerce, 14
- International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC), 11, 40, 244
- International Conference on Financing for Development, 156, 160

- International Council of Nurses, 11
 International Court of Justice (ICJ),
see under United Nations
 International Criminal Court, 19, 64,
 159, 222, 246, 277
 International Crisis Group, 171
 International Crisis Prevention and
 Response Centre (proposed),
 174–5, 235–6
 International Debt Arbitration
 Mechanism (proposed), 159
 International Federation of Metal
 Workers Organization, 11, 14
 international financial institutions
 (IFIs), 92, 112, 134, 151, 176, 262
International Herald Tribune, 61
 International Labour Organization
 (ILO), 13, 81, 87
 international law, 11–12, 219
 international humanitarian law,
 218, 233, 246, 274
 International Maritime Organization
 (IMO), 17
 International Monetary Fund (IMF),
 xiv, 6, 83–5, 107–15, 134, 136,
 140, 146, 155, 175, 259, 261,
 276–7
 Articles of Agreement, 127, 157
 bail-out programmes, 99, 111, 114,
 157
 Code of Good Practices on Fiscal
 Transparency, 140
 Code of Good Practices on
 Transparency in Monetary and
 Financial Policies, 140
 Contingent Credit Line (CCL), 135
 Enhanced Structural Adjustment
 Facility, 157
 Poverty Reduction and Growth
 Facility (PRGF), 157
 reform of, 157–8
 Special Data Dissemination
 Standard, 140
 structural adjustment policy, *see*
 structural adjustment
 (programmes)
 surveillance role of, 157
see also Bretton Woods institutions
 International Organization of
 Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
 137, 140
 International Peace Operations Centre
 (proposed), 243, 245
 International Satellite Organization
 (INTELSAT), 17
 International Taxation Organization
 (ITO), 149, 159, 261
 International Telegraph Union (ITU),
 10, 13, 61
 International Union for Publication of
 Customs Tariffs, 10–11
 International Veterinarian Congress,
 11
 Internet, 17–18, 63, 65–6
 Iran, 5, 16–17, 31, 35, 39, 47, 50–1,
 171–2, 181, 200, 207–8, 281
 Iranian revolution, *see* revolutions
 Iraq, 5, 16–17, 39, 41, 50–1, 56, 171–2,
 181–2, 200, 203–8, 214, 226, 237,
 243, 279
 Ireland, 185, 281
 Ireland, Northern, 168, 171, 231
 Islamic Conference Organization, 269
 isolationism, 93
 Israel, 35, 41, 50, 181, 185, 200, 207,
 279, 282
 Italy, 6, 9, 13–14, 58, 142
 Ivory Coast, 171
 Jamaica, 48
 Japan, 6, 7, 13–14, 30, 32, 58, 94, 107,
 120, 142, 181, 279
 foreign investment, 107–8, 119
 international financial reform
 proposals, 133, 153–4
 Plaza Accord and, 107
 United Nations and, 16, 260
 Jones, D.L., 167
 Jospin, Lionel, 133
 J.P. Morgan, 111
 judicial settlement, *see* adjudication
 Kashmir dispute, 231
 Keynes, J.M., 79, 85–6, 141
 Keynesian approach, 5, 130
 Khatami, Mohammad, 47
 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 45
 Kim Dae Jung, 112
 Kindleberger, C., 106
 King, Martin Luther, 23
 King, Rodney, 46
 Kittani, Ismat, 170
 Klare, Michael, 199
 Knight, Andy, 274
 Kobrin, Jeremy, 256
 Korea, 56, 225, 232

- Korea – *continued*
 North, 39, 181–2, 200
 South, 7, 31–2, 92, 107, 110–12
 Kosovo, 35, 39, 176, 214, 225–6, 230, 233, 248
 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 265
 Krugman, Paul, 118, 120–1, 123
 Ku Klux Klan, 46
 kulaks, 34
 Kuwait, 16, 51, 171–2, 199
 Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, 19
- Labour Party (Britain), 47, 134
 Labour Party (Israel), 50
 Lafontaine, Oskar, 133
 landmines, 83, 183–4
 Campaign to Ban Landmines, 18, 22, 159
 Geneva Conference on landmines, 189
 Landmine Ban Treaty, 19, 64
 League of Nations, 12–14, 274
 Lebanon, 56, 207, 226
 Leekpai, Chuan, 112
 legitimacy, 85, 231–3, 243–4, 256, 262, 277
 crisis of, 78–9, 86–8, 272
 Le Pen, J.-M., 38, 46
 less-developed countries (LDCs), 8, 15–16
 Bretton Woods institutions and, 92
 New World Economic Order, 16
 UNCTAD and, 21
 compared to rich individuals, 81
 Levitt, Theodore, 90
 Libya, 5, 39, 200
 liberalization, 95–9, 111, 114
 capital-account (CAL), 99, 109, 114, 127–9, 131–2
 economic, 90, 93, 98–9, 128
 financial, 90, 94, 96, 98–9, 108, 114, 130, 133–4, 155
 trade, 11, 95, 109, 112, 129, 134, 158
Libération, 133
 libertarianism, 56
 Libya, 181
 licences, 10, 31–2, 68
see also intellectual property
 Likud Party (Israel), 50
 localism, 44–7
 Long Term Capital Management, 86
 Luxembourg, 48
- Macedonia, 35, 226, 236
 Machiavelli, 23
 Magna Carta, 55
 Mahathir, Mohammad, 93, 97, 139
 Malaysia, 7, 31–2, 48, 97, 99, 107, 110, 112, 123, 139, 281
 Manchuria, 13
 Mandela, Nelson, 23, 45
 Manifest Destiny, doctrine of, 11, 42
 markets
 emerging, 96–8, 136–7
 market fundamentalism, 64, 78–9, 83, 85–8
 in relation to the state and civil society, 58–60
 market-to-book value, 121
 Marx, Karl, 6, 51
 Marxists, 70
see also Structuralist-Marxist approach
 McLuhan, Marshall, 33
 McQuaig, Linda, 77
 McVeigh, Timothy, 51
 media, 63, 278
 mass media, 61, 66
 pluralism in, 63, 66–7
 mediation, 175, 238, 267
 Mexico, 18, 35, 106, 127, 185
 Middle East, 183, 185, 191
 minority rights, 169, 257
 missiles, 181, 199
 Missile Technology Control Regime, 181
 Mittelman, James, 22, 40, 71
 Miyazawa initiative, 154
 modernity, 52
 Mohammad Reza Shah, 50
 money laundering, 86
 Monroe Doctrine, 9–10
 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 19
 moral hazard, 117, 120–1, 124, 130, 135
 ‘Moral Majority’ (USA), 50
 more-developed countries (MDCs), 16
 Morgenthau, 79
 Mosaddeq, Mohammad, 50
 Moses, 55
 Mozambique, 214
 Muhammad, 55
 Mujahedin, 51
 Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 20, 159

- multilateralism, 274, 278
 regional, 39
 universal, 39–40
 multinational corporations (MNCs),
 see transnational corporations
 Multinational UN Standby Forces High
 Readiness Brigade, 245
 Murphy, Craig N., 3, 8
 Myanmar (Burma), 59

 Namibia, 214, 226
 Napoléon (Bonaparte), 8
 National Foreign Trade Council (USA),
 59
 nationalism, 40, 172
 National Missile Defence system
 (USA), 181, 186
 national reconciliation, 247
 National Science Foundation (USA), 18
 NATO, *see* North Atlantic Treaty
 Organization
 Nazism, 58, 79
 Negri, Antonio, 99
 neo-isolationism, 38
 neo-liberalism, 22–3, 84, 134
 neo-traditionalism, 35
 Netherlands, the, 48, 136, 171
 neutrality, 167
 New Agenda Coalition, 185–6, 188,
 191, 194
 new constitutionalism, 134
 New Deal policies (USA), 5, 79
 new medievalism, 256
Newsweek, 61
 New World Communication and
 Information Order, 16
 New World Economic Order, 16
 New World Order, 39
New York Times, 203
 New Zealand, 185, 281
 NGOs, *see* non-governmental
 organizations
 Nigeria, 171
 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 21
 non-governmental organizations
 (NGOs), xiv, 21, 59, 151–2, 268
 emerging global civil society, 11, 17,
 40, 64
 League of Nations era, 14
 rule creation, 19
 Tobin Tax and, 87
 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 182–3,
 189–90
 NPT Review Conferences (proposed),
 189, 195
 Nordic Council, 191
 North American Free Trade Area
 (NAFTA), 39–40, 71, 153, 277, 279
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO), 39–40, 71, 171, 267, 279
 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 265
 in Kosovo, 16, 84, 226, 233, 266,
 278
 North-South conflict, 5, 94, 151, 202,
 205, 279
 Norway, 107, 167, 170, 173, 222
 nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs),
 45, 183, 186–95
 nuclear weapons, 14, 181–95,
 199–206

 Ocampo, J.A., 132
 official development assistance (ODA),
 95–6, 107
 offshore centres, 86, 96, 133, 135,
 140–1
 oil crisis, 16
 Olaf Palme Commission, 185
 ombudsman, 221, 246
 Operational-level headquarters
 (proposed), 216, 221–2
 ‘organic intellectuals’, 280
 Organization of African Unity (OAU),
 171, 175, 183, 269, 279
 Organization of American States
 (OAS), 175
 Organization of Economic
 Cooperation and Development
 (OECD), 23, 71, 80–1, 83–4, 86,
 90, 93, 127, 175, 269
 Organization of Petroleum Exporting
 Countries (OPEC), 16, 21, 23
 Organization for Security and
 Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
 170–1, 191, 267, 269, 276
 Oslo Accords, 167, 173
 Ottawa Convention, 189
 Outer Space Treaty, 183
 Oxfam, 40, 244

 Pacific Conference of Churches, 269
 Pakistan, 39, 41, 51, 181, 184–5
 Papua New Guinea, 232
 Park, Yung Chul, 119
 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 183,
 186

- patents, 8, 10, 31–2, 68, 84
see also intellectual property
- Patnaik, Prabhat, 131
- 'Pax Democratica', 63, 71
- Peace and Security Reserve Fund
 (proposed), 265
- peacebuilding, 166, 176, 214, 237,
 239, 247–9, 265
 post-conflict peacebuilding, 166–7,
 171, 248
- peace enforcement, *see* peace
 operations
- peacekeeping, *see* peace operations
- peacemaking, 165–6, 169, 214, 239,
 265
- peace operations, 172, 212–26,
 230–49, 265
 mandates, 218–19, 223–4,
 240–1
 status of forces agreements, 219
- Peace Operations Adviser (proposed),
 244–7
- peasantry, 80
- Pentagon, attack on, *see* September 11
 (2001) terrorist attacks
- Peoples' Assembly (proposed), 156,
 159, 195, 257–8, 262
- Pericles, 56
- Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12
- Permanent Court of Justice, 12
- Perot, Ross, 35
- Perry, William, 200
- Persian Gulf, 17, 39
- Peru, 35
- peso* (Argentinian), 96
- peso* (Mexican), 107, 125
- Phillippines, the, 11, 31, 107
- Plaza Accord, 107
- Polanyi, Karl, 78, 90
- pollution, 17, 48–9, 56, 255, 272
see also environment
- Pomerleano, Michael, 121
- portfolio investors, 107, 117–25
see also hedge funds, speculators
- poverty, 81, 147, 205–6, 216, 261
 human, 147
 modernized, 38
- Prebisch, Raul, 131
- preventive deployment, 166, 216,
 236–7, 245
- private property rights, 82, 86, 91
- progressive era, 5
- protectionism, 13, 33, 38
- Putnam, Robert, 64
- Quantum Fund, 123
- Radelet, S., 120, 122
- Radiotelegraph Union (RTU), 10
- Rambouillet Agreement, 266
see also Kosovo
- Ramphal, Sir Sridath, xiv
- Rapid Reaction Force (proposed), 221,
 245, 247
- Reagan, Ronald, 16, 40
 Reagan Administration, 199
- real* (Brazilian), 96
- Red Crescent, *see* International
 Committee of Red Cross
- Red Cross, *see* International
 Committee of Red Cross
- reformism
 adaptive, 274
 incremental, 274
 radical, 274–5
- refugees, 41, 175–6, 214, 231
- regimes, international, 10, 15, 206
- regionalism, 40, 71–2, 153–4, 170,
 190–1, 273, 279
- regional organizations, xiv, 172, 175,
 187–8, 190–1, 237, 265–8
- Reich, Robert, 6
- Reimagining the Future*, xiii
- religious revivalism, 49–53
- Republican Party (USA), 50
- revolutions
 American, 45, 56
 communist, 5, 56
 democratic, 56
 English, 56
 French, 56
 industrial, 58
 Iranian, 16, 35, 51, 66
 Russian, 56, 78
- Rhineland, 13
- Rieff, D., 151
- ringgit* (Malaysian), 97, 123, 139
- Robertson, Julian, 140
- 'rogue' doctrine, 198–206
- Rolin-Jacquemyns, Baron, 12
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 14
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 42
- Rosenau, James, 68
- Rubin, Robert, 133
- Ruggiero, Renato, 20
- rupiah* (Indonesian), 112
- Russia, 5, 39, 85, 86, 97, 266, 279
 biological weapons programme, 204
 entry into world markets, 18

- Russia – *continued*
 landmines and, 184
 mafia capitalism in, 19, 23
 nuclear weapons, 183, 185
 political instability, 31
 Revolution, *see under* revolutions
- Rwanda, 16, 172, 174, 214, 231–2
- Ryan, Michael, 7
- Sachs, Jeffrey, 85, 120, 122
- Saddam Hussein, 199–200
- Samprasong Land Company, 122–3
- sanctions, 206–7, 212, 217, 219, 237–8
- San Francisco Conference (United Nations Conference), 15
- satellites, 17, 33, 65, 264
- Saudi Arabia, 16, 31, 50–1, 171
- Save the Children, 14
- Scandinavia, 48
- Scheffran, Jurgen, 186
- Schelling, Thomas, 32
- Schmidt, R., 141
- Schumpeter, Joseph, 5
- Seabed Treaty, 183
- security, 34–7, 64, 182, 198, 259
 collective, 12, 212, 260, 266
 common, 185
 competitive, 37
 comprehensive, 248
 co-operative, 37
 environmental, 198
 human, 34, 83, 167, 175, 198, 218, 248, 258, 269, 272
- Security Council, *see under* United Nations
- self-determination, 12, 41, 67, 69, 172
- Sen, Amartya, 92, 146
- September 11 (2001) terrorist attacks, 22, 51, 81, 181, 195, 198, 205, 226, 255, 281
- Serbia, 84, 266
see also Yugoslavia
- Sierra Leone, 214, 230
- Sinai, 214, 226
- Singapore, 16, 32, 107, 135, 142
- Slovenia, 185
- Smith, Adam, 5
- social democracy, 134
- Social Democratic-Green alliance (Germany), 133
- Social Watch, 159
- Solferino, Battle of, 11
- Somalia, 16, 39, 214, 232, 243
- Soros, George, 67–8, 78, 83, 94, 97, 99, 123, 140
- South Africa, 21, 32, 41, 59, 172, 185, 190, 281
- South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), 71
- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 40
- Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), 71, 153, 265
- sovereignty, xvi, 9, 60, 114, 168, 176, 232–3, 256, 276
- Soviet Union, 41, 56, 199–200, 226, 232
 biological weapons programme, 204
 demise of, 3, 5, 7, 14, 29, 33, 66, 255, 277
 intervention in Afghanistan, 51
- Spaceship Earth, 49
- Spain, 9, 48, 58, 94
- Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (SRSGs), 242, 269
- Special Sessions on Disarmament (proposed), 189–95
- speculative mania, 106–7, 117
- speculators, 85, 96, 135, 148
see also hedge funds, portfolio investors
- [Der] Spiegel, 61
- Sri Lanka, 41, 48
- stabilization, *see* economic stabilization
- Stalin, Josef, 14
- standby arrangement system(s), 220, 242, 245
- START I, 182
- START II, 182, 185
- state
 corporate welfare, 6
 financial globalization and, 91
 functions/roles of, 91–2, 281
 minimalist, 5
 new capitalist, 6
 in relation to market and civil society, 58–60, 152, 276, 281
 regulatory, 5
 social welfare, 5, 45
 sovereignty, *see* sovereignty
 territorial, 56, 58
 warfare, 5, 45
- Stavrianos, L.S., 11
- sterilization, 137–8
- Stiglitz, Joseph, 99, 114

- Strange, Susan, 23, 33
 Strategic Committee (proposed), 243–7
 structural adjustment (programmes), 84, 90, 92, 107, 127, 129
 Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), 159
 Structuralist-Marxist approach, 130–1
 subsidiarity, principle of, 147, 256, 261
 subsidies, 85
 Sudan, 205
 Suharto, 112
 Sumatra, 7
 summons, power of, 156–7
 surveillance, 33
 Sweden, 94, 99, 136, 142, 185, 194, 281
 Sweezy, Paul, 16
 Switzerland, 136, 142
 Swyter, Han, 199
 Syria, 50, 181, 200, 207
- Taiwan, 7, 32, 97, 107
 Tajikistan, 35, 41, 47
 Taliban, 24, 41, 51
 tax, 80, 132
 currency transaction tax (CTT), 140–2, 159, 264
 international taxes, 264
 Taylor, Lance, 147
 technology, 65
 Tehran Conference, 16
 telecommunication, 17, 36, 65
 terrorism, 25, 33, 51, 69, 198, 200, 214, 272, 279, 282
 Thatcher, Margaret, 16
 Thailand, 32, 48, 85, 92, 99, 107, 110
 Asian financial crisis and, 109–13, 119–22
 Bangkok International Banking Facility, 119
 Bank of, 123
 Mental Health Institute, 111
 Ministry of Interior, 113
 Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 111, 113
 National Economic and Social Development Board, 110
 Stock Exchange of (SET), 119, 121, 123
 Theatre Missile Defense system (USA), 181, 186
 ‘Third Way’ approach, 133–4
 Third World, 16, 83–4, 107, 199
- Tietmayer, Hans, 135
 Tiger Fund, 140
Time, 61
 Tlatelolco Latin American Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (LANWFZ), 182–3
 TNCs, *see* transnational corporations
 Tobin, James, 87, 140–1
 Tobin’s *q*, 121
 Tobin Tax, 87–8, 141, 223
 Tokyo Forum, 185–6, 189
 trademarks, 10, 68
 see also intellectual property
 Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 8
 Training Assistance Teams (UN), 243
 transitional administration, 219
 transnational corporations (TNCs), 7, 59–61, 82–3, 98, 175, 255
 appropriation of local knowledge, 8
 and Asian financial crisis, 111
 globalization, 20
 the state and, 92–3, 130
 United States and, 60
 transnational financial corporations (TFCs), 60–1
 transnational media corporations (TMCs), 60–1
 Transparency International, 19
 transparency, principle of, 115, 124, 132, 135, 137, 139–40, 157, 174, 206–8, 232, 240, 243–4, 259, 268, 273
 Trilateral Commission, 22
 trilateralism, 39
 trusteeship system, 14
 Tupac Amaru, 35
 Turkey, 35, 56
- Unabomber, 51
 unemployment, 24, 46, 78, 80–1, 99, 110
 unilateralism, 39, 64, 277
 United Arab Emirates, 51
 United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), 10
 United Nations (UN), the
 Charter of, 15, 166, 234, 241, 243, 276: Article 19, 264; Article 33, 166, 216; Article 34, 166; Article 40, 218, 240; Article 42, 219, 240; Article 43, 220, 234; Article 45, 234; Chapter VII, 218–19; Chapter VIII, 265

- United Nations (UN), the – *continued*
 Conference on Disarmament (CD), 182, 184, 189
 Declaration by, 14
 Department for Disarmament and Arms Regulation (UNDDAR), 184: Advisory Panel on the UN Disarmament Action Plan (proposed), 188, 192
 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 170, 222, 242
 Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 169–70
 Deputy Secretaries-General (proposed), 222
 Disarmament Commission, 182, 184, 189
 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 156, 216, 261
 Executive Committee on Peace and Security, 179, 235, 248
 General Assembly, 14, 157, 169, 175, 182, 185, 189, 233, 257, 264, 276: and disarmament, 182, 185, 189; and UN finances, 264
 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 175, 186, 216
 Lessons Learned Unit, 170
 Office of the Military Adviser, 222
 Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, 242
 Secretariat, 190, 216, 218, 221–3, 262–3
 Secretary-General, 170–1, 222–3, 236, 245, 262–3
 Security Council, 14, 157, 169, 182–3, 189, 205, 233, 236, 259–61: Military Staff Committee, 218; peace operations and, 216–23; Permanent members of, 15, 183, 213, 219, 260, 275
 Senior Management Group, 263
 specialized agencies, *see* UN specialized agencies
 system, 8, 17, 19, 159, 222, 235, 247, 255–63, 268, 276
 United Nations Conference (San Francisco), 15
 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 16
 UN national offices (proposed), 174–5, 235
- UN-sponsored world conferences, *see* under conferences
 UN specialized agencies, 156, 175
 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 244, 248
 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 21, 93, 98, 136, 139, 156, 158
 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 47, 81, 87, 147, 248
 UN Economic Commission for Africa, 268
 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 268
 UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), 17, 48
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 175, 244, 248
 UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), 170
 UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (Kathmandu), 267
 UN Special Commission for Weapons Inspection in Iraq (UNSCOM), 200, 205
 UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions (Central Africa), 267
 United States of America (USA), 4, 6, 14, 50, 72, 78, 106–7, 142, 276
 attitude towards weapons of mass destruction, 183, 185, 201, 206
 Bankruptcy Law, 159
 capital-account convertibility and, 94
 CIA, 199, 201
 civil society and, 64
 Congress, 183, 199, 203
 Defence Science Board, 199
 democracy in, 56, 64
 Department of Defence, 18
 Department of State, 46
 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, 201
 ethnic conflict in, 41
 Federal Reserve Bank, 86, 112
 gold convertibility, 15
 human rights and, 60
 IMF and, 114
 imperialism and, 11
 Kyoto Protocol, 19, 64
 mass media, 61
 multilateralism, 14, 16

- United States of America (USA) –
continued
 neo-isolationism, 38
 neo-traditionalism in, 35
 Office of Technology Assessment,
 204
 poverty in, 81
 President's Working Group on
 Financial Markets, 137
 robber baron capitalism in, 23
 and South African apartheid, 59
 Treasury, 111, 137, 153
 UN finances and, 264
 unilateralism, 64, 133, 206, 255
 withdrawal from UNESCO, 16
 world trade and, 13
 Universal Declaration of Human
 Rights, 56, 280
 universalism, 277–8
 Universal Postal Union (UPU), 10, 13
 Unrepresented Peoples' Organization
 (UNPO), 60–1
 Urquhart, Sir Brian, 246
 U Thant, 171
 Uzbekistan, 41
- Vedrine, Hubert, 133, 204
 Venezuela, 281
 Versailles, Treaty of, 13
 veto, power of, 14–15, 154, 184, 186,
 189, 194, 226, 233, 235, 247,
 259–60, 262, 277
 Vienna, Congress of, 8
 Vietnam, 15, 56, 109
- Wall Street, 94, 107
Wall Street Journal, 61
 Warsaw Pact, 40
 Washington consensus, 118, 120, 128,
 131
 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),
 56, 181–95, 198–208
- weapons-of-mass-destruction-free
 zones (WMDFZs), 187–95
 Webster, William, 199
 Welfare Party (Turkey), 50
 Wells, H.G., 70
 Westdal, Christopher, 190
 West New Guinea dispute, 171
 Westphalia, Peace/Treaty of, 3, 4,
 31, 41
 Wilson, Woodrow, 41
 women's rights, 24, 47
 working class, 13, 56, 58, 69,
 92
- World Alliance of Young Men's
 Christian Associations, 11
 World Bank, 83–4, 99, 107–8, 115,
 118, 134, 146, 155, 160, 248, 259,
 261, 269
see also Bretton Woods institutions
 World Economic Forum, 22, 133, 160,
 259, 276
 World Federalists, 69
 world government, 69
 World Health Organization (WHO),
 183, 244
 World Intellectual Property
 Organization (WIPO), 7
World Policy Journal, 61
 World Trade Centre, attack on,
see September 11 (2001)
 terrorist attacks
 World Trade Organization (WTO), xiv,
 19, 59, 61, 92, 146, 151, 153, 155,
 158, 160, 261
see also General Agreement on
 Trade and Tariffs
 World Wide Web, 18, 66
- Yalta Conference, 14
 Yemen, 171
yen (Japanese), 133, 153
 Yugoslavia, 39, 41, 174